-Rob Hagy, Charlottesville Custody and Visitation and Child Support Lawyer. For help with your questions about child support or custody and visitation, please contact me at (434)293-4562 or email me at rob@robhagylaw.com.
In the case of In re Marriage of Popa and Garcia, the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, Sixth Division, ruled that a custodial parent's violation of the terms of a custody and visitation order does not excuse the non-custodial parent from paying child support. But, active and extreme interference with the noncustodial parent's relationship with the children by the custodial parent may establish a substantial change in circumstance that warrants modification of the noncustodial parent's child support obligation.
-Rob Hagy, Charlottesville Custody and Visitation and Child Support Lawyer. For help with your questions about child support or custody and visitation, please contact me at (434)293-4562 or email me at rob@robhagylaw.com.
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In the case of Tartaglino v. Tartaglino, the Virginia Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, ruled that the trial court did not err in denying mother’s request to terminate her children’s therapy. Father and mother divorced on December 22, 2011. They have two children. During the parties’ separation, father requested that the children receive therapy because of problems between him and the oldest child. The final decree of divorce awarded the parties joint legal custody of the children, with mother having primary physical custody. Paragraph 11 of the final decree stated: The children shall continue in therapy with Dr. Van Syckle until Mother and Father agree that therapy is no longer reasonable or necessary, Mother and Father agree to select a new therapist for either child, or Dr. Van Syckle elects to discontinue therapy with either child. The parties shall pay for Dr. Van Syckle’s services, or the services of another therapist, per income share as used to calculate child support. Dr. Van Syckle provided therapy for the children. On July 3, 2012, mother asked Dr. Van Syckle to conclude the children’s therapy. Dr. Van Syckle declined and informed mother that therapy would continue on an as-needed basis. On July 19, 2012, Dr. Van Syckle met with father and the children. He informed them that there was no need to return, except on an as-needed basis. Dr. Van Syckle also met with mother and father and informed them that therapy would be provided on an as-needed basis. On October 4, 2012, mother filed a motion to modify the final decree and asked the trial court to enter an order terminating the requirement that the children remain in therapy with Dr. Van Syckle because the therapy was no longer reasonable or necessary. On February 22, 2013, the parties appeared before the trial court on mother’s motion to terminate the children’s therapy. Dr. Van Syckle testified that the children’s relationship with their father had improved and that therapy had been “very successful.” Dr. Van Syckle confirmed that he had not terminated the children’s therapy, although he had not seen them for several months. He explained that he thought it was in the best interests of the oldest child for him to remain involved on an as-needed basis. Mother testified about the children and their “warm and loving relationship” with their father. After hearing the testimony and argument, the trial court noted that Dr. Van Syckle thought the therapy should continue and father did not agree to terminate therapy.
Mother argues that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to modify the therapy provisions in the final decree of divorce. She contends that the therapist had not seen the children for months and therapy was no longer necessary. The trial court heard evidence about the children’s progress in therapy. Mother testified that she thought therapy should terminate, whereas Dr. Van Syckle testified that the children should not discontinue therapy. Dr. Van Syckle specifically stated that it was in the oldest child’s best interests to continue therapy on an as-needed basis. The final decree stated that therapy with Dr. Van Syckle would continue for the children until mother and father agreed that it should be terminated, mother and father obtained a new therapist, or Dr. Van Syckle terminated therapy with either child. The trial court noted that the parents did not agree on whether the therapy should be terminated and “Dr. Van Syckle thinks that for the future, the short-term future or whatever, that this therapy needs to continue.” Accordingly, the trial court explained that “the order speaks for itself” and denied mother’s motion. Here, the trial court held that the language in the final decree prevented termination of the children’s therapy unless the parties agree or Dr. Van Syckle agrees. None of the conditions for termination had been met. The trial court did not err in denying her motion. -Rob Hagy, Charlottesville Divorce and Custody and Visitation Lawyer. For help with issues like this or with other custody and visitation issues, please contact me at (434)293-4562 or email me at rob@robhagylaw.com. Read this article on my Charlottesville Divorce Lawyer blog to see how futile a Texas father's efforts were and what the results were in his case. He could have avoided this request by just making a little more effort and taking a few more steps, but he was far too trusting of his wife's attorney how failed to complete the work that needed to be done.
-Rob Hagy. For help with your child support issues, please contact me at (434)293-4562 or email me at rob@robhag In the case of Hughes v. Hughes, the Virginia Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, ruled that the trial court erred and reversed the trial court's equitable distribution award and remanded the case for the trial court to reconsider the equitable distribution of the parties’ property and debt. Wife was granted a divorce from husband in 2010. When the parties separated, they had significant joint debts, in the form of mortgages and a home equity line of credit (HELOC), encumbering the marital residence. Much of the debt was used to finance a business run by both parties during the marriage. Husband continues to operate this business. Shortly after the divorce proceedings began, and before the trial court addressed equitable distribution, husband filed for bankruptcy. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, the court stayed the equitable distribution hearing during the bankruptcy proceedings. In bankruptcy, husband discharged his obligations to the creditors who held the mortgage and home equity line, leaving wife solely responsible for the entire obligation to their third-party creditors. After a hearing on equitable distribution, the trial court granted wife the marital residence and granted husband possession and control of the business. In granting wife the marital residence, the trial court noted that it “has no value in excess of the liens currently against it,” i.e., the marital residence had a negative equity. The trial court stated that the negative equity was in the amount of $100,000 to $150,000. However, when the trial court specifically turned to the issue of debt, it apportioned only two credit card debts. The trial court properly classified the marital residence as marital property and properly valued the marital residence. However, the trial court failed to properly account for or apportion the mortgage loan or the HELOC. Further, it failed to take into account the negative equity in the marital residence in arriving at its equitable distribution award. “[T]o the extent that a valid indebtedness which is secured creates an encumbrance on the legal title, that indebtedness must be considered by the trial court in determining the value of the marital property for purposes of determining the amount of the monetary award.” Trivett v. Trivett, 7 Va. App. 148, 151, 371 S.E.2d 560, 562 (1988). At the time of the equitable distribution award, the marital residence was encumbered by the mortgage and HELOC. The trial court failed to consider these encumbrances in determining the value of the marital property and the apportionment of marital debt. Therefore, the trial court misapplied the statutory mandate contained in Code § 20-107.3 and, in doing so, abused its discretion.
--Rob Hagy, Charlottesville Divorce and Equitable Distribution Lawyer. For help with your property or debt distribution issues, please contact me at (434)293-4562 or email me at rob@robhagylaw.com. In the case of Bokassa v. Bokassa, the Virginia Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, ruled that the trial court did not err when it ordered father to pay mother $1,000.00 in child support. Mother and father never married, have two children, and share physical custody of the children. Mother filed a request for child support. The juvenile and domestic relations district court entered an order requiring father to pay mother child support, and father appealed to the circuit court. On November 19, 2012, the circuit court held a hearing on the matter. According to the written statement of facts, mother testified she was not employed and received $1,000 per month in child support from father. According to the written statement of facts, the circuit court determined father’s gross income, gave father credit for support payments for a child from another relationship, and gave father credit for the health insurance he pays for the children.According to the final order, the circuit court considered all the factors in Code § 20-108.2(D) and deviated from the shared custody guidelines due to mother’s “poverty level.” The circuit court ordered father to pay “only” $1,000 per month because that was the amount mother requested. Based upon a review of the circumstances in this case, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in deviating from the shared custody guidelines in determining the amount of child support and in ordering father to pay mother $1,000 per month in child support.
-Rob Hagy, Charlottesville Child Support Lawyer. For help with your child support questions, please contact me at (434)293-4562 or email me at rob@robhagylaw.com for assistance. I spent yesterday attending the Virginia Trial Lawyer Association's 2013 Family Law Seminar titled "Everything You Wanted to Know About Child and Spousal Support". I learned a lot that I'm eager to share with my clients!
-Rob Hagy, Charlottesville Divorce Lawyer. For help with your child and spousal support needs, please contact me at (434)293-4562 or email me at rob@robhagylaw.com. In the case of Patterson v. Patterson, the Virginia Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, ruled that a wife was entitled to $2,150.00 per month in spousal support. The parties had been married for twenty-six years and that three children were born of the marriage. Further, the husband was in good physical condition. The wife's physical condition was deteriorating. She had been diagnosed with lymphoma, lupus, and diabetes. During the marriage, both parties worked, although husband was the "primary breadwinner" and wife was the "primary caretaker of the children." Both parties contributed one hundred percent of their activities and energies, both monetary and non-monetary, to the marriage and the well being of their family throughout the majority of their marriage. Wife's physical condition limits her employment skills in the future. Wife showed a need for spousal support and husband has shown an ability to provide it. The trial court properly deemed some of husband's monthly expenses as excessive. The court disregarded the husband's recreation and charitable donations. The court disregarded the money he pays his adult daughter and
the excessive expenses he listed for automobile costs. The court also properly reduced the excessive monthly debt payments the husband claims he makes. Husband also asserts that the trial court should have considered wife’s earning capacity; however, husband presented no evidence as to what wife may have been able to earn. To the contrary, the evidence was that wife was on permanent disability and unable to work. -Rob Hagy of Rob Hagy Law, Charlottesville Divorce and Spousal Support Lawyer. For answers to your questions about spousal support, please contact me at (434)293-4562 or email me at rob@robhagylaw.com. Charlottesville Divorce lawyer rob hagy of rob hagy law: is your attorney a good communicator?8/26/2013 Please click here to read a new blog entry on posted on the Charlottesville Divorce Lawyer Blog.
-Rob Hagy, Charlottesville Divorce Lawyer. Interesting article today from U.S. News and World Report.
-Rob Hagy, Charlottesville Divorce Lawyer. Extraordinarily scary facts in this case. The victim is lucky to be alive.
-Rob Hagy, Charlottesville Divorce Lawyer. For help with issues like these, please call me a (434)293-4562 or email me at rob@robhagylaw.com. |
ABOUTI am a divorce and domestic relations attorney located in Charlottesville, Virginia. I practice in all of the cities and counties making up Central Virginia (Charlottesville, Albemarle, Buckingham, Greene, Fluvanna, Orange, Louisa, Goochland, Nelson). I also appear in Waynesboro, Stanton, Augusta, Harrisonburg, Amherst and Lynchburg. I am also available to consult or appear with clients throughout the rest of Commonwealth of Virginia and even other states if their rules permit my appearance. Archives
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