On March 12, 2026, the Supreme Court of Virginia issued its decision in Perkins v. Howington, addressing a question that may seem unusual at first: if a parent was under a court order not to contact a child, can that same court-ordered period of no contact later satisfy the no-contact requirement of a Virginia adoption statute that allows a case to proceed without that parent’s consent?

In Perkins v. Howington, the answer was yes. The Court upheld a stepparent adoption without the biological mother’s consent, explaining that the no-contact order did not end the analysis. Courts may also consider why that order was entered and whether the parent took meaningful steps to change the situation.

What Virginia Law Requires

In Virginia, a biological parent usually must consent before an adoption can be finalized. But Virginia Code § 63.2-1202(H) creates an exception. Under that statute, consent is not required if a birth parent, without just cause, has neither visited nor contacted the child during the six months immediately before the adoption petition is filed. The adoptive parent must prove that by clear and convincing evidence. The statute also says that child support alone does not count as contact.

That means the court must answer two separate questions:

• Did the parent have any contact with the child during the six months before the adoption petition was filed?
• If not, was there a legally sufficient reason for that lack of contact?
  
  

Background of the Case

The child’s parents separated, and child-protective proceedings later began after allegations that the mother used drugs in the child’s presence. The juvenile court found the child had been abused or neglected in the mother’s care based on evidence that included substance use disorder, failed drug screens, admitted intravenous drug use, and track marks. The father was later awarded custody, and in July 2020 the court entered an order stating that the mother was to have no contact or visitation with the child until further court order.

In April 2021, the father and stepmother filed for stepparent adoption. They argued that the mother’s consent was not required because she had gone more than six months without visiting or contacting the child. The mother objected, arguing that she was complying with the no-contact order and had tried to regain visitation.

The circuit court approved the adoption without her consent. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Virginia Supreme Court did as well.

The Six-Month No-Contact Requirement

The Supreme Court said the first part of the statute is straightforward. The question is simply whether the parent visited or contacted the child at all during the six months immediately before the adoption petition was filed. Courts are not supposed to weigh the quality of the contact or broaden that specific inquiry beyond the statutory time period.

Here, the petition was filed on April 13, 2021, so the relevant period ran back to October 13, 2020. It was undisputed that the mother had neither visited nor contacted the child during that time. That meant the no-contact portion of the statute was satisfied.

How Courts Look at “Just Cause”

The more complicated issue was whether the mother had just cause for that lack of contact.

The Supreme Court explained that just cause is not a rigid rule. It is a broader standard that requires the trial court to look at the surrounding facts and circumstances. Once the court sees there was no contact during the six-month period, it must ask why, and then decide whether that reason was justified.

In practical terms, that means a court may look at things like:

• why the no-contact order was entered in the first place
• whether the parent’s own conduct led to the order
• whether the parent acted promptly to try to restore contact
• whether the parent complied with court requirements while trying to do so
  
  

The Role of the No-Contact Order

The mother’s main argument was that she was under a court order not to contact the child, so that lack of contact should not be held against her. The Supreme Court said that fact was relevant, but it was not the end of the analysis.

The circuit court was allowed to look at how the no-contact order came about. In this case, the order arose from abuse-and-neglect findings tied to the mother’s substance-abuse issues. Because of that, the trial court was allowed to conclude that the underlying reason for the lack of contact was still the mother’s own conduct.

The Supreme Court also noted that the mother’s efforts to restore contact were mixed. Although she later sought visitation, the record showed that she did not immediately move to set aside the no-contact order when it first came up for review, and she failed to file a bill of particulars the juvenile court had ordered her to provide. The circuit court also heard evidence that her substance-abuse-related problems had continued, including missed or failed drug screens.

Taken together, those facts supported the circuit court’s conclusion that the lack of contact was without just cause. The Supreme Court therefore held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in allowing the adoption to proceed without the mother’s consent.

What the Supreme Court Rejected

Although the Supreme Court affirmed the adoption, it rejected part of the Court of Appeals’ reasoning. The lower court had treated the issue too mechanically, suggesting that when a parent’s misconduct led to a no-contact order, the lack of contact would automatically be without just cause. The Supreme Court said that went too far.

That means a no-contact order may be strong evidence, but it does not automatically decide the issue by itself. The court must still examine the larger history, including why the order was entered and what the parent did afterward.

What This Decision Means for Families

For stepparents and other prospective adoptive parents, Perkins v. Howington confirms that Virginia’s six-month no-contact statute can apply even when the lack of contact occurred during a court-ordered no-contact period. A no-contact order does not automatically prevent an adoptive parent from arguing that consent is unnecessary.

For biological parents, the case is also important because it shows that the existence of a no-contact order, by itself, may not preserve the right to block an adoption. A court may still examine the full history, including what led to the order and what happened afterward.

At the same time, the opinion does not say that every parent under a no-contact order automatically loses the right to object to an adoption. The Supreme Court specifically rejected that kind of bright-line rule. Instead, courts must consider the full facts and circumstances in each case.
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The result in Perkins v. Howington gives clearer guidance on how Virginia courts will handle these disputes: the six-month period matters, but so does the reason for the lack of contact.

​Rob Hagy is a Virginia divorce and family law attorney serving Charlottesville, Virginia, and surrounding communities. You can see more content from Rob at www.charlottesvilledivorceattorney.com and at www.virginiafamilylawjournal.com.

For many spouses, the hardest fight in a divorce is not over furniture or bank accounts. It is over the dog or cat that has been part of daily life for years. But in Virginia, pets are not treated like children in custody cases. They are treated as property.

That means there is no automatic rule that one person gets the pet, and there is no standard child-custody analysis for deciding who keeps it. Instead, the issue is handled through equitable distribution.

Pets Are Legally Property in Virginia

Under Virginia law, dogs and cats are considered personal property. In a divorce, that places the pet within the court’s broader property-division analysis rather than custody law.

This can feel harsh to people who see a pet as family, but it is the legal framework the court applies.

When the Pet Was Acquired Can Make a Difference

If one spouse owned the pet before the marriage, the pet will usually be considered separate property. If the pet was acquired during the marriage, it is more likely to be treated as marital property.

Records can matter here. Adoption paperwork, licensing documents, veterinary records, and proof of who paid expenses may all become relevant if ownership is disputed. This is an inference from Virginia’s equitable-distribution framework, which looks at ownership and the parties’ interests in property.

The Court Looks at Practical Facts, Not “Pet Parenting”

Virginia follows equitable distribution, meaning property is divided fairly, not necessarily equally. In a dispute over a pet, practical facts may carry real weight: who paid for the animal, who handled routine care, who covered vet bills, and who has primarily been responsible for the pet after separation. This is an inference from how equitable-distribution factors are applied, rather than a pet-specific statutory test.

So while people often think of this as a custody fight, the court is really deciding ownership as part of dividing property.

Virginia Courts Do Not Seem to Favor Shared Pet Custody

Virginia appellate authority does not support court-ordered shared custody or visitation for pets. In Whitmore v. Whitmore, the husband asked for shared possession of the dog or a visitation schedule, but the trial court rejected that request, and the Court of Appeals upheld the ruling.

That makes an important point clear: Virginia courts do not treat pet disputes the way they treat child custody and visitation disputes.

Agreements Often Work Better Than Litigation

Because the law treats pets as property, spouses who want a more flexible arrangement may be better off resolving the issue by agreement. A separation agreement can address who keeps the pet, who pays expenses, and whether the other spouse will still have time with the animal. That approach can give the parties more control than leaving the issue entirely to the court. This is an inference from the property-based framework and the lack of support for court-imposed pet visitation in Whitmore.

For many divorcing couples, the emotional reality is that a pet is family. Virginia law, however, approaches the question as one of property ownership and fair distribution. Knowing that distinction early can help shape a more realistic strategy.

​Rob Hagy is a Virginia divorce and family law attorney serving Charlottesville, Virginia, and surrounding communities. You can see more content from Rob at www.charlottesvilledivorceattorney.com and at www.virginiafamilylawjournal.com.

In an unpublished opinion issued February 3, 2026, the Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed a Chesterfield County Circuit Court ruling in Cox v. Cox, rejecting the husband’s challenges to the valuation of a cash balance pension plan, the trial court’s determination that his income was $75,000 per month, and an $11,000 monthly spousal support award.

The case arose from a long-term marriage with three children and focused heavily on the husband’s interest in CBH Holdings, LLC, a financial planning business. A major issue was a cash balance pension plan maintained through the business. The evidence showed that the plan was funded at unusually high levels over several years and functioned as a significant tax-advantaged retirement vehicle for the owners. CBH contributed about $3.5 million to the plan from 2017 through 2022, with more than $1.2 million contributed in 2022 alone. The wife’s expert testified that the plan had been overfunded by $1,200,600 through the end of 2021 and valued the husband’s share at $1,419,000 as of December 31, 2022.

On appeal, the husband argued that the trial court should have valued the marital share of the plan as of the parties’ separation date, July 16, 2021, rather than December 31, 2022. The Court of Appeals disagreed. The record showed that CBH typically funded the plan in the year after the year the contribution related to, so the later valuation date better captured what was earned during the marriage. The court specifically pointed to evidence that $500,000 of a $1 million loan obtained by the husband after separation was used to fund 2021 plan contributions.

The husband also argued that the pension contributions should not have been treated as voluntary contributions attributable to him. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument as well, noting evidence that the loans used to help fund the plan were in his name, that he handled day-to-day operations, and that he had primary responsibility for administering the pension plan. On that record, the trial court was entitled to find that he exercised substantial control over the plan and its funding.

That same pension issue carried over into support. Because the husband did not take a traditional salary from the business, both experts agreed that his income had to be “normalized.” The wife’s expert treated the substantial pension contributions as part of the husband’s overall income picture, reasoning that a business owner should not be able to divert a significant portion of earnings into a retirement vehicle and then claim those funds are unavailable for support. Using that approach, he concluded that the husband’s annual income was $900,000, or $75,000 per month. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in accepting that figure.

The husband’s double-counting and ERISA arguments failed too. The Court of Appeals found no improper windfall because the wife’s marital share of the plan was fixed as of December 31, 2022, while spousal support began later, on July 17, 2023. The court also rejected the argument that a future QDRO would necessarily violate ERISA, especially where no QDRO had yet been rejected and the trial court had reserved that issue if implementation problems arose.
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On spousal support, the Court of Appeals likewise affirmed. Although there was evidence that the wife could earn more by working full-time as a pharmacist, the trial court declined to impute full-time income to her. The record showed that one child had Type 1 diabetes and had been hospitalized twice, while another had anxiety-related self-harming behavior. The trial court also considered the family’s standard of living during the marriage and the fact that the wife had remained home with the children. Under those circumstances, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the $11,000 monthly support award.

Cox v. Cox serves as a helpful reminder that courts may look beyond the label a business owner places on their compensation when determining income for support purposes. The decision also illustrates how closely courts may examine retirement contributions made through a closely held business, particularly when those contributions appear discretionary rather than mandatory. More broadly, the opinion underscores the wide latitude trial courts have when weighing earning capacity, the needs of the children, and the practical realities of the family’s financial circumstances.

​Rob Hagy is a Virginia divorce and family law attorney serving Charlottesville, Virginia, and surrounding communities. You can see more content from Rob at www.charlottesvilledivorceattorney.com and at www.virginiafamilylawjournal.com.

n an unpublished opinion issued March 3, 2026, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that a trial court could not add new terms to a military retired pay division order that were not included in the parties’ original property settlement agreement.

Military retirement provisions in divorce agreements can create major enforcement problems if they are not drafted carefully from the start. This case shows that even when payment issues arise later, a court cannot simply add new terms to make the agreement work.

In Pollock v. Pollock, the parties’ property settlement agreement provided that the wife would receive 50% of the marital share of the husband’s military retirement, based on “gross pay.” After entry of the final decree, the wife attempted to obtain approval from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) for a military retired pay division order, but DFAS rejected the proposed order twice.

The trial court later entered an amended order that did two significant things. It required the husband to pay the wife directly if DFAS did not, and it changed the agreement’s language from “gross pay” to “disposable retired pay.”

The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the trial court could not add an indemnification provision the parties had never included in their original agreement. It also held that changing “gross pay” to “disposable retired pay” improperly changed the substance of the parties’ bargain.
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The takeaway is straightforward: when military retirement benefits are addressed in a Virginia divorce settlement, the language matters. If the parties want protections such as backup direct-payment obligations or other enforcement terms, those provisions should be clearly included in the agreement itself rather than added later through litigation.

​Rob Hagy is a Virginia divorce and family law attorney serving Charlottesville, Virginia, and surrounding communities. You can see more content from Rob at www.charlottesvilledivorceattorney.com and at www.virginiafamilylawjournal.com.

One of the most common and emotional questions in divorce is whether one spouse will be able to stay in the family home. Beyond sentimental value, a house is often a couple’s largest financial asset, which makes the decision both personal and practical.

In Virginia, there is no automatic rule that one person keeps the house or that everything must be divided evenly. The outcome depends on how the property is classified and what arrangement is fair under the circumstances.

How the Home Is Classified Matters

If a home was purchased during the marriage, it is typically considered marital property, even if only one spouse’s name is on the deed or mortgage.

A home owned before marriage, received as a gift, or inherited may be separate property. However, if marital income was used to pay the mortgage, renovate, or improve the home, part of its value may be considered marital. This is often called hybrid property.

Because of this, whose name is on the title does not automatically decide who keeps the house.

What Courts Consider

Virginia follows equitable distribution, meaning property is divided fairly rather than necessarily 50/50. Courts may consider:

• each spouse’s financial contributions and earning capacity
• the length of the marriage
• how assets and debts are divided overall
• custody arrangements and children’s stability needs
• whether either spouse can realistically afford the home
  
  

Often, the deciding factor is not who wants the house, but who can maintain it.

Common Ways the House Is Handled

Every case is different, but most situations resolve in one of these ways:

• One spouse keeps the home and compensates the other for their share of the equity.
• The home is sold and the proceeds are divided.
• Temporary possession allows one parent and the children to remain in the home for a period before sale.
• Asset trade-offs allow one spouse to keep the home while the other receives assets of similar value.
  
  

Balancing Emotion and Financial Reality

Wanting to remain in the home is understandable, especially during a time of transition. However, the long-term costs of mortgage payments, taxes, insurance, and maintenance must be realistic on a single income.

In some cases, selling the home provides greater financial stability and a cleaner fresh start.
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Understanding your options early can help you make informed decisions and protect your financial future.

Rob Hagy is a Virginia divorce and family law attorney serving Charlottesville, Virginia, and surrounding communities. You can see more content from Rob at www.charlottesvilledivorceattorney.com and at www.virginiafamilylawjournal.com.

A February 2026 ruling by the Virginia Supreme Court has drawn national attention and underscores an important principle of Virginia adoption law: once an adoption order becomes final, it is extremely difficult to challenge.

The case involved a U.S. Marine and his wife who adopted a child injured during a military operation in Afghanistan. A Virginia court finalized the adoption in 2020. The child’s Afghan relatives later sought to challenge the adoption, asserting that the process was flawed and that they had been caring for the child with approval from Afghan authorities.

Lower courts found significant problems with how the adoption had been obtained and ruled that it should be voided. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed those rulings and reinstated the adoption.

The Legal Issue: Finality of Adoption Orders

The Supreme Court’s decision centered on Virginia’s adoption finality statute, Virginia Code § 63.2-1216, which strictly limits when an adoption order may be challenged. Under the statute, once an adoption has been final for a specified period, it can be attacked only under very narrow circumstances.

The Court concluded that the relatives lacked legal standing to challenge the adoption and that the statutory time limits barred their claims, even though serious defects in the adoption process were alleged.

This rule reflects the legislature’s intent to promote stability and permanence for children. Courts seek to avoid situations in which a child’s placement is disrupted after an adoption has been finalized.

A Divided Court
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The decision was not unanimous. In dissent, three justices sharply criticized the adoption process and expressed concern about fairness and integrity in the proceedings.

The dissent highlights the tension courts sometimes face between ensuring finality and addressing alleged procedural wrongdoing.

Why This Decision Matters

The facts of this case are unusual and international in scope. However, the legal principle at the center of the ruling applies to all Virginia adoptions, not only international or military-related placements.

Virginia law strictly limits when an adoption order may be challenged. Once an adoption is finalized and the statutory challenge period has passed, courts are reluctant to disturb the adoption except in very narrow circumstances. This rule is designed to provide permanence and stability for children and adoptive families.

The decision reinforces several key principles:

• Adoption orders carry strong legal finality once entered.
• Challenges must be brought promptly and by parties with legal standing.
• Procedural deadlines can determine whether a challenge will be heard.
• Courts prioritize stability and permanence for children.
  
  

Although this case involved complex international facts, the Court’s emphasis on finality reflects a principle that governs adoption proceedings across Virginia.

What Virginia Families Should Know

Adoption proceedings involve strict procedural requirements and significant legal consequences. Once an adoption becomes final, undoing it is extremely difficult.

Families involved in adoption matters should ensure that all legal requirements are properly addressed from the outset and seek guidance when questions arise. Careful attention to procedure and timing can be critical.
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While the circumstances of this case are extraordinary, the Court’s ruling serves as a reminder that adoption orders are intended to provide lasting stability for children and families.

​Rob Hagy is a Virginia divorce and family law attorney serving Charlottesville, Virginia, and surrounding communities. You can see more content from Rob at www.charlottesvilledivorceattorney.com and at www.virginiafamilylawjournal.com.

Not all child custody cases involve divorce. Unmarried couples have kids, too, and if the relationship ends, they also need to resolve custody issues.

If you’re the father in such a relationship, it’s critical to consult with an attorney because you may not have the rights you think you have.

For one thing, while married parents have equal rights over their children, many states have laws that favor unmarried mothers over unmarried fathers. Some, like South Carolina, even state that custody of a child born out of wedlock automatically goes to the biological mother unless she relinquishes her rights. Only if the father has legally established paternity, perhaps by having his name on the child’s birth certificate, may he then petition for visitation or custody.

In such situations, you would have to initiate a paternity action under which you, the mother and the child submit genetic testing to the court.
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Once your paternity has been established, the court would treat you and the mother as equals in making a determination as to what sort of custody arrangement would be in the child’s best interest. In doing so, the court would consider each parent’s ability to take care of the child and their respective relationship with the child.

The bottom line, however, is that as an unmarried father, you would need to jump through hoops in order obtain custody or visitation rights, to have the right to be involved in major decisions in your child’s life, and to prevent your child’s adoption by your ex’s new partner or spouse.

Divorce can be a lengthy, expensive and emotionally draining process, particularly when parties end up in court fighting over assets and children. It can also feel like an invasion of privacy since most divorce filings and proceedings are a matter of public record. If you are anxious about these issues, mediation might be something worth considering.

Mediation is a form of dispute resolution in which divorcing spouses work with a neutral third-party mediator to identify key issues of contention, discuss each side’s concerns, and negotiate a settlement that’s agreeable to both sides. Once the settlement is agreed upon, it’s memorialized in a legally enforceable contract that lays out the terms.

Mediation typically takes six months or less, compared to court proceedings that often take more than a year. A quicker process usually also means less in legal costs.

Beyond the time factor, mediation offers more flexibility in scheduling than court proceedings. Rather than adhering to the schedule of a backlogged court, the parties and the mediator can set a calendar tailored to the parties’ needs, making the process more efficient and less disruptive.

Additionally, mediation is private, so the parties don’t need to worry about private matters being exposed in a family court that is open to the public. And should mediation ultimately not work and the parties end up in court, matters discussed in mediation are considered confidential in most states and can’t be brought into court as evidence.

Mediation further enables parties to work with a mediator to craft creative solutions to complex disputes over real estate, financial investments, and especially issues of child custody, parenting and support. Rather than being stuck with a rigid formula that often binds judges, the mediator can work with parties to create a detailed, customized plan.
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However, mediation isn’t for everyone. When conflict overwhelms communication, the process may stall. Taking time to evaluate whether mediation aligns with your circumstances can help you choose the most productive way to move ahead.

​Supervised visitation is a court-ordered arrangement that a court might order in which a neutral third-party adult, such as a social worker or child development expert, supervises visits between a child and the non-custodial parent. This usually takes place in a designated location agreed upon by the parties.

Though supervised visitation is nobody’s preferred arrangement for seeing their kids, family courts prioritize the child’s best interest, and in certain situations courts think supervised visitation is the best option to keep a child safe while still maintaining the parental relationship.

For example, supervised visitation is frequently ordered when the non-custodial parent has a mental illness or substance abuse disorder that could impair their judgment and pose a risk to the child’s safety.

A court might also order supervised visitation if the non-custodial parent is deemed unable to provide a safe, secure environment for the child in their home. The court might make the same judgment if the parent has a past history of domestic violence, child abuse or neglect.
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Additionally, supervised visitation may be appropriate when the child has gone a long time without contact with the noncustodial parent, either due to estrangement, geographical distance, or other factors. A supervised setting can be seen as a safe, supportive environment to rebuild a child’s connection with the parent. The neutral third party typically has the training to be able to facilitate communication and help rebuild the connection.

On January 1, 2026, Tennessee implemented the first domestic violence offender registry in the United States. The registry was created under Savanna’s Law and requires the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation to maintain a public database listing individuals who have been convicted of multiple domestic violence offenses. The database includes identifying information such as name, date of birth, photo, and counties of conviction. It is designed to identify patterns of repeat violence without publishing home addresses or Social Security numbers.

The law was enacted in response to the 2022 murder of Deputy Savanna Puckett by a former partner with a known history of domestic violence. Legislators concluded that critical information about repeat offenders was too difficult for the public to access in real time. The registry is intended to close that gap.

How Virginia Handles Domestic Violence Now

Virginia does not have a domestic violence offender registry. Instead, the Commonwealth relies on criminal penalties, enhanced sentencing for repeat offenders, civil protective orders, and firearm restrictions.

What This Means for Virginia Going Forward
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Whether registries like this become the national trend remains to be seen, but Virginia practitioners should anticipate that the issue may come up in the future. When one state creates a first-in-the-nation public safety database, others inevitably begin evaluating how similar issues may arise in their own jurisdictions.

Tennessee’s registry represents a new approach to tracking repeat domestic violence offenders. The policy argument behind the law is that patterns of violence often remain hidden until tragedy occurs.
For now, Virginia’s framework remains focused on criminal enforcement, protective orders, and enhanced penalties for repeat behavior. Tennessee has chosen a different path, and its experience will be closely watched by courts, lawmakers, and practitioners across the country.